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THE ROLE OF MOTOR AFFORDANCES
IN VISUAL WORKING MEMORY
ABSTRACT: Motor affordances are important for object knowl-
edge. Semantic tasks on visual objects often show interactions
with motor actions. Prior neuro-imaging studies suggested that
motor affordances also play a role in visual working memory for
objects. When participants remembered manipulable objects (e.g.,
hammer) greater premotor cortex activation was observed than
when they remembered non-manipulable objects (e.g., polar bear).
In the present study participants held object pictures in working
memory while performing concurrent tasks such as articulation
of nonsense syllables and performing hand movements. Although
concurrent tasks did interfere with working memory performance,
in none of the experiments did we find any evidence that concur-
rent motor tasks affected memory differently for manipulable and
non-manipulable objects. I conclude that motor affordances are
not used for visual working memory.
1. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are performing a complicated task, for example prepar-
ing a meal or fixing a bike, which involves manipulating various objects.
Your performance would be very efficient if you could start preparing
actions before you looked at the object. As you are stirring the sauce
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you could already start planning to grab a knife with one hand and
a tomato with the other hand. You might even take the future action
of cutting the tomato into account so that the knife is in your domi-
nant hand with the blade facing down. Such planning would involve
working memory, in which the objects that are currently out of the field
of vision are kept active. In this paper I will review research that in-
vestigated whether working memory also retains affordances for those
objects.
2. GROUNDED COGNITION
Recent theories of cognition propose that the elements of thought are
not words or symbols, but visual and motor images (e.g., Barsalou
1999; Glenberg 1997; Goldstone & Barsalou 1998; Pecher & Zwaan
2005; Zwaan 1999). According to this grounded cognition view, think-
ing shares resources with perception and action. When a person thinks
about an object such as a tomato, earlier experiences with tomatoes are
reactivated. This reinstatement of earlier activation results in a sensory-
motor simulation. The visual system simulates seeing a tomato, the mo-
tor system simulates the acts of grasping, cutting, and eating a tomato,
and the olfactory and gustatory system simulate the smell and the taste
of a tomato. Thus, thinking about a tomato, the brain acts partially
as if the person is actually perceiving and interacting with a tomato.
Rather than an exact replica of experiences, however, these patterns are
distorted and represent only partial experiences. In Barsalou’s (1999)
theory, simulators capture patterns of activation for a particular cate-
gory of experiences. As a result, they represent a distributed pattern of
experiences with a concept such as tomato. Simulation of experiences
is dynamic and flexible and can even represent imaginary events.
2.1. Perception and Cognition
Research has shown that representations are organized along sensory-
motor modalities and contain modality-specific information. In per-
ception, switching modalities between trials incurs a processing cost
(Spence et al. 2001). For example, participants who respond to light
flashes and noise bursts respond more slowly if the previous stimulus
was in a different modality than if it was in the same modality. Pecher,
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Zeelenberg & Barsalou (2003) showed that mental representations be-
have in a similar way. When participants had to verify a property for a
concept, for example red for tomato, they were slower if the previous
verification was for a property from a different modality, for example
loud for blender, than from the same modality, for example sparkles for
diamond (see also Lynott & Connell 2009; Marques 2006; Pecher et al.
2009a, 2004; Vermeulen et al. 2007). The same effect was obtained
if, instead of verifying a concept-property pair, on the previous trial
participants indicated the location of a perceptual stimulus such as a
burst of noise or a flash of light (Dantzig et al. 2008). Other studies
have shown that when language comprehenders read sentences, their
mental representation of the sentence meaning is a simulation of the
described experience, including visual information that was not directly
stated in the sentence. For example, when participants read The eagle
was in the sky, they were able to recognize a picture of an eagle with
its wings stretched out more quickly than one with its wings folded in,
whereas the reverse was found if they read The eagle was in the nest
(Stanfield & Zwaan 2001; Zwaan et al. 2004; Zwaan & Pecher 2012;
Zwaan et al. 2002). Such results point out that there is overlap in per-
ceptual features between the mental representation of an object and the
perception of that object. The effect of visual overlap was also found
when there was an hour-long interval between sentence reading and
picture processing (Pecher et al. 2009b). Thus, implied visual features
are not only represented during online language processing, but remain
more salient after longer delays. Similar effects are found even if the
task contains no visual information. When participants are asked to list
properties of concepts, they are more likely to name properties that are
visible from an implied perspective than properties that are not visible
from the implied perspective (l. Wu & Barsalou 2009). For example,
seeds is named more frequently as a property of half a watermelon than
as a property of a watermelon. Words that refer to objects with similar
shapes (banjo-tennis racket) can prime each other in simple tasks such
as lexical decision or word pronunciation (Pecher et al. 1998). Thus,
perceptual features are relevant for concepts during language compre-




2.2. Action and Cognition
A major role for cognition is to support people’s actions in the world
(Glenberg 1997). The potential actions that a person can perform on
an object are referred to as affordances. Affordances thus provide im-
portant information to the observer about the potential actions that can
be performed with objects (Glenberg & Kaschak 2002). For example,
a cup affords grasping, lifting, and tilting, allowing the user to drink
from it. Such motor affordances are proposed to be central to concep-
tual knowledge (Borghi 2005; Glenberg 1997). There are two sources
for the activation of affordances. First, perception of an object activates
its affordances; when a person perceives the physical characteristics of
an object, such as its shape and size, the object’s affordances are au-
tomatically activated. Second, memory of previous interactions with
objects may be retrieved on a later occasion and affect behavior. Glen-
berg (1997) argues that the combination of these two sources forms
the mental concept of an object. Masson, Bub & Breuer (2011) showed
that both visible affordances (the object’s orientation) and affordances
from memory (the orientation that would be needed to use the object
in its conventional way) affected a grasp response. These results sug-
gest that affordances are activated by both perceptual information and
knowledge of the object’s function (Lindemann et al. 2006). More-
over, studies have found that affordances are activated by words and
sentences that refer to manipulable objects or actions (Aravena et al.
2010; Borghi & Riggio 2009; Glover et al. 2004; Klatzky et al. 1989;
Bub et al. 2008; Rueschemeyer et al. 2010b; Taylor & Zwaan 2008;
Zwaan & Taylor 2006), indicating that direct visual information is not
even necessary to activate affordances.
3. AFFORDANCES AND VISUAL WORKING MEMORY
The question is whether motor affordances also support working mem-
ory, or short term memory, for objects. As illustrated at the beginning of
this paper, in many situations performance will be better if affordances
are kept active in working memory. Working memory might recruit the
motor system to maintain such affordances. If the motor system is thus
part of working memory, it might also be used in contexts where there is
no need for an action plan. Affordances might be activated anyway, and
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they provide useful information about objects, so using that information
might improve memory performance. Several studies have suggested
that object affordances are activated automatically when someone sees
an object, even if the object is depicted on a computer screen and there
is no intention to perform an action with that object (Bub et al. 2008;
Bub & Masson 2010; Olivier & Velay 2009; Taylor & Zwaan 2010) al-
though several other studies suggest that the task or context plays a
role (Borghi et al. 2012; Bub et al. 2003; Ellis & Tucker 2000; Girardi
et al. 2010; Pellicano et al. 2010; Rueschemeyer et al. 2010a; Tipper
et al. 2006). Tucker and Ellis (2004) found that semantic categoriza-
tions were faster and more accurate when the response grip required for
categorization was compatible with the object affordance than when it
was incompatible. Masson (2011) showed that hand responses were af-
fected by the orientation of a task-irrelevant object’s handle but also by
the object’s function. This result indicates that the source of such auto-
matically activated affordances is a combination of visual and semantic
information. On the other hand, some studies have questioned whether
such effects are caused by activation of affordances, or might be due to
more abstract correspondences between visual stimuli and the manual
response. For example, effects that show facilitation when an object
affords a grip with the same hand as used for responding compared to
when it affords a grip with the opposite hand might also be explained
by abstract spatial codes (Cho & Proctor 2010, 2011; Iani et al. 2011;
Pellicano et al. 2010; Proctor & Miles 2014). Thus, there is some de-
bate on whether affordances are activated automatically. If they are,
however, working memory might use them to maintain objects.
Research has indicated that the motor system is recruited by work-
ing memory when the task requires motor information. When partic-
ipants have to keep actions in memory, the motor system seems to be
involved (Rossi-Arnaud et al. 2004; but see Helstrup 2001). Concurrent
motor tasks interfere with working memory for actions, especially when
they focus on the same aspect of actions (Smyth et al. 1988; Smyth &
Pendleton 1989; Woodin & Heil 1996). A role of the motor system
in working memory has also been suggested by neuro-imaging studies
that obtained activation of the premotor cortex during visual working
memory tasks (Haxby et al. 1994; Owen et al. 1996, 1999; Smith 2000).
However, most of these results might be due to response planning dur-
www.thebalticyearbook.org
Motor Affordances 6
ing the retention interval, because tasks typically require tapping or
pointing to spatial locations as a response (Postle 2006). Nonetheless,
these findings might also indicate that the motor system was recruited
for memory maintenance. Postle & D’Esposito (1999) did not observe
any differences in the fMRI bold response between spatial and object
working memory, suggesting that the same processes underlie memory
for these different types of information.
3.1. The Causal Role of Affordances
A study by Mecklinger, Gruenewald, Weiskopf & Doeller (2004) found
activation of premotor cortex in a working memory task for manipu-
lable but not for non-manipulable objects. Since manipulable objects
have affordances whereas non-manipulable objects do not, these results
strongly suggest that affordances are recruited for working memory.
Some caution is needed when one interprets such findings, however,
because fMRI results that are mostly correlational cannot show whether
activated regions are necessary to perform a task, nor do they show that
a particular process was recruited (Poldrack 2008; see also Aue et al.
2009; Page 2006; Horn & Poldrack 2009). When researchers observe
brain activation in overlapping areas between two tasks, they tend to
conclude that the tasks must share a functional component. Such a con-
clusion is only valid, however, if brain regions are involved in only one
particular function, and we know this is not the case. When researchers
still draw conclusions about function from activation in certain brain ar-
eas, they are committing the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent.
Moreover, instead of being the cause of behavior, activation of a brain
area might just as likely be the result or a mere side-effect of behav-
ior (Mahon & Caramazza 2008). A similar point has been made about
behavioral studies that showed effects of semantic processing of ob-
jects on motor responses. These effects might show only co-activation
of affordances during or after processing semantic features of the ob-
ject. Thus, even though affordances have been activated, they might
not have contributed to the semantic representation of the object but
might merely be a byproduct of semantic processing (Bub et al. 2008;
Page 2006). Therefore, activation of a brain area that is also involved in
motor tasks is not sufficient to conclude that motor simulations support
working memory.
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Evidence from interference studies, however, has indicated that lan-
guage processing and learning are supported by the motor system. In
these studies, a concurrent task that occupies the motor system is shown
to affect cognition (Busiello et al. 2011; Casteel 2011; Dijkstra et al.
2007; McCloskey et al. 1992; Paulus et al. 2009; Witt et al. 2010). For
example, Busiello et al. (2011) found reduced repetition priming for
actions when participants concurrently performed a hand motor task
compared to a verbal task. This finding indicates that the motor task
interfered with creating a memory representation and thus suggests
that mental representations for actions rely on activation of motor af-
fordances. Casteel (2011) argued that whether action and conceptual
processing interfere depends on the timing of the two processes. In
particular, when the two are performed in parallel, they result in inter-
ference (see Vermeulen et al. 2008, for a similar finding in perceptual
processing). Rueschemeyer et al. (2010a) showed that such interfer-
ence effects occurred when participants performed intentional actions
but not when they performed passive actions (i.e., when the finger was
forced to move by a device). Interference effects on performance pro-
vide evidence that motor affordances contribute to comprehension be-
cause they show that when it is harder to activate motor affordances,
comprehension suffers.
3.2. Investigating the Role of Affordances in Working Memory
3.2.1. Study 1
Interference paradigms have also been used to investigate whether the
motor system and working memory performance are causally related.
In our lab, we have investigated the role of the motor system for visual
working memory. In the first study (Pecher 2013) photos of manipula-
ble (e.g., pliers) and non-manipulable objects (e.g., road sign) were pre-
sented in a working memory task. Mecklinger et al. (2004) found dif-
ferences in premotor cortex activation between manipulable and non-
manipulable objects, and argued that because manipulable objects have
affordances, the motor system was recruited to maintain these objects
in memory, whereas non-manipulable objects have no affordances, and
therefore the motor system would not be recruited. Because of this dif-
ference, a concurrent motor task would be expected to disrupt memory
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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performance more for manipulable objects than for non-manipulable
objects.
In the working memory task an object was presented briefly, fol-
lowed by a 5 second retention interval during which participants had
to keep the object in memory. Then the test stimulus was presented,
and participants indicated if the test object was the same as the study
item. Only a small set of objects was presented repeatedly in the work-
ing memory task to prevent contribution from long term memory. When
objects are repeated often, they all become very familiar, and subjects
have to actively maintain the object in working memory in order to
perform the task. The role of the motor system was investigated by
having participants perform a concurrent motor task. In this task par-
ticipants made a fist and then stretched their fingers one by one. A mo-
tor task like this, which keeps changing the hand configuration, should
be most likely to interfere with grasping and other types of object di-
rected actions (Smyth et al. 1988; Smyth & Pendleton 1989; Woodin &
Heil 1996). Moreover, because the task is dissimilar to any interactions
with any of the objects, the results would not be complicated by dif-
ferences in congruency between affordances and motor task. Because
the motor task would make it harder to recruit the motor system for
memory, participants might change their strategies. In particular, they
might use verbal encoding so that they could maintain the object in
memory by repeating its name. In that case, any difference between
manipulable and non-manipulable objects might disappear. To prevent
a verbal strategy, participants were also instructed to repeat a series of
four nonsense syllables during some blocks of the experiment. Thus,
in different blocks of trials, participants performed no concurrent task,
the motor task, the verbal task, or both tasks while they were doing the
working memory task.
Whereas all these tasks decreased performance in general, the mo-
tor task did not affect memory for manipulable objects more than for
non-manipulable objects, neither when only the motor task was per-
formed nor when the verbal task was also performed. Such an interac-
tion was predicted if participants had used motor affordances to main-
tain the objects in working memory, because motor affordances can sup-
port memory for manipulable objects more than for non-manipulable
objects. Although the concurrent tasks influenced performance, the
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memory task might have been too easy to show the interaction between
motor task and manipulability. In several follow-up experiments, the
study trial showed four rather than just one object, and participants
had to keep all four objects in memory during the retention interval.
However, the results again did not show an interaction between mo-
tor task and manipulability. These results indicated that visual working
memory does not rely on the motor system. It is possible that partici-
pants used mostly visual information to retain the objects in memory. To
investigate whether removing this reliance on visual information might
push participants toward using affordances, a visual interference task
was used. In this task, participants saw an array of many colored blocks
that changed color randomly during the retention interval. The results
showed again no interaction between motor task and manipulability. In
short, in five experiments Pecher (2013) did not find any evidence that
a concurrent motor task had a larger effect on memory for manipulable
than non-manipulable objects.
3.2.2. Study 2
In a second study, we further investigated the effect of motor interfer-
ence using a different measure of working memory (Pecher et al. 2013).
In the previously described study Pecher (2013) difficulty was varied by
manipulating the number of items on the study trial from one to four
between experiments. The effect of increasing the number of items was
not just an increase in memory load, however, but also a visually more
complex study trial. Moreover, the question is to what extent affor-
dances for each object will be activated if four objects are presented
simultaneously. Thus, in the easier conditions motor affordances might
not have been used to keep the object in memory because the task was
easy and could be performed visually, and in the difficult condition mo-
tor affordances might not have been activated because four objects with
different affordances were presented at the same time. In order to ex-
clude these potential problems, Pecher et al. (2013) used the N-back
task, in which a series of items is presented individually, and partici-
pants indicate whether an item is repeated at a distance (lag) of N trials.
For example, in a 2-back task the sequence might be pliers – paperclip
– pocket knife – paperclip – stock pot – pliers. The second occurrence
of paperclip would be a target repetition because it occurs two steps
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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from the first occurrence, but the second occurrence of pliers is farther
than two steps and would not count as a target repetition. The N-back
task is a popular working memory task in neuroimaging studies. An
advantage of using this task is that one can easily manipulate memory
load without changing the visual information or response requirements
(Jaeggi et al. 2010). Moreover, when objects are presented individu-
ally there is enough opportunity for activation of motor affordances for
each object. In one experiment we presented photographs of familiar
manipulable and non-manipulable objects. The same concurrent mo-
tor and verbal tasks as in Pecher (2013) were used. The results showed
decreased performance with increasing lag, confirming that the mem-
ory task became harder as more items needed to be maintained. As in
the previous study, the concurrent tasks affected performance in gen-
eral, but there was no interaction between the motor task and object
manipulability. To further decrease the role of verbal rehearsal, in a
second experiment we used novel objects, taken from Taylor & Zwaan
(2010). The manipulable object was a smooth sphere that looked gras-
pable, and the non-manipulable object was a spiked sphere that did
not look graspable. If participants cannot use verbal labels to maintain
stimuli in memory, they should rely more on other types of information.
Thus, it would be more likely that affordances were used to maintain
the spheres in memory. To further promote participants’ reliance on
affordances we varied the spheres in size only. In order to distinguish
between different stimuli, participants thus needed to keep the size of
the spheres in working memory. As size is strongly related to grip, sup-
port from affordances would greatly enhance working memory perfor-
mance. Therefore, if there are circumstances in which affordances play
a role, this should be a strong case. However, again there was no inter-
action between the motor task and object manipulability.
3.2.3. Study 3
A reason for this lack of support for the motor system might be that in
both studies discussed so far the concurrent motor task was only inter-
fering with affordances. That is, the motor action that was required by
the task was incompatible with any potential interaction with the ob-
jects. One could argue that in such a case participants may have stopped
paying attention to the motor system, because any attention to the mo-
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tor system would have hurt performance. Therefore, in a third study,
Quak et al. (2014) changed the concurrent motor task so that the ac-
tion was congruent with one set of items and incongruent with another
set of items. The concurrent task was to squeeze a rubber cylinder. Be-
tween blocks we manipulated whether the cylinder was large and held
by the entire hand (power grip) or small and held between the thumb
and index finger (precision grip). The objects that needed to be held in
memory were non-manipulable (e.g., wall), manipulable with a power
grip (e.g., soda can), or manipulable with a precision grip (e.g., pin). If
object affordances were used for memory, memory for objects should be
better if the concurrent task was congruent with the object’s grip than if
the concurrent task was incongruent with the object’s grip. The results
of this study showed that, like in the previous studies, although the con-
current task did interfere with memory performance in general, there
was no difference in performance between congruent and incongruent
conditions.
4. CONCLUSION
In summary, the results from these three studies do not confirm that
motor affordances are used to support working memory. If participants
had used motor affordances for manipulable objects we should have
obtained interactions between object manipulability and motor inter-
ference, but the data did not provide any evidence for this. Because
many researchers might be wary of drawing conclusions from null find-
ings, we also performed Bayesian tests, which can be used to evaluate
whether the data provide more evidence for the null or alternative hy-
pothesis (Masson 2011; Wagenmakers 2007). These analyses showed
that the data provided positive to strong evidence for the null, that is,
for the absence of an interaction. This conclusion was the same un-
der different circumstances, such as different difficulty levels, whether
there was verbal interference, visual interference, for familiar and novel
objects, and even when the motor task could have been helpful. Thus,
the conclusion is that the motor system does not support visual working
memory.
It might be argued that we simply failed to interfere enough with
motor affordances to find differences between manipulable and non-
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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manipulable objects, or between congruent and incongruent objects.
This would be inconsistent, however, with other studies that have used
similar tasks, such as squeezing a rubber tube or sequentially touching
the head, shoulders, and hips with both hands. In studies on working
memory for actions such tasks have been shown to affect performance
(Rossi-Arnaud et al. 2004; Smyth & Pendleton 1989; Smyth et al. 1988;
Woodin & Heil 1996). Our tasks were similar in nature and difficulty
as those used by these other studies. Therefore, it seems unlikely that
they were not strong enough to cause interference in the motor system.
The absence of a role for motor affordances in visual working mem-
ory should not be taken to indicate that motor affordances play no role
at all in cognition. Indeed, there are many situations in which motor af-
fordances and cognition interact. As mentioned above, several studies
have shown effects of motor interference on working memory for ac-
tions (Rossi-Arnaud et al. 2004; Smyth & Pendleton 1989; Smyth et al.
1988; Woodin & Heil 1996). These results suggest that the motor sys-
tem is recruited when the task explicitly requires people to remember
actions. Second, as discussed earlier, many studies have shown a role
of affordances in tasks that require semantic or conceptual knowledge.
This suggests that conceptual knowledge includes the actions that can
be performed with an object, and is activated even under circumstances
that do not require action execution. Thus, object affordances have a
role in cognition, at least under circumstances that require explicit ac-
tion knowledge or deeper conceptual knowledge. Visual working mem-
ory, however, might not rely so much on conceptual knowledge. In gen-
eral, working memory seems to depend mostly on the modality of the
items that are remembered. This is consistent with many studies show-
ing that interference effects in working memory depend on similarity in
terms of surface features rather than meaning (Baddeley 2003; Cowan
1999; Wood 2007). In the present study the stimuli were presented
visually, which may have resulted in memory representations that were
mostly visual.
One might think that the conclusion that visual working memory is
not supported by the motor system is inconsistent with fMRI findings
that showed activation of the premotor cortex during working memory
maintenance of manipulable objects (Mecklinger et al. 2004). These
fMRI findings might be explained by different mechanisms, however.
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First, it is possible that participants in Mecklinger et al.’s study were us-
ing long-term memory to perform the task. Performance in short-term
memory tasks is actually the result of both short-term and long-term
memory retrieval (Hulme et al. 1991; Lewis-Peacock & Postle 2008;
Shiffrin 1993; Watkins 1977). Because Mecklinger et al. presented
many different study items this resulted in many trials on which both
study and test item were new (i.e., presented for the first time during
the experiment). Therefore, long-term familiarity alone would have
been a good indicator of whether the item was a target (familiar) or a
distracter (unfamiliar). To prevent long-term memory retrieval we used
only a small set of items so that familiarity alone was not an indicator
of whether the item had been presented N trials back. Second, their
results might have been caused by just the visual presentation of the
object and could have been unrelated to the memory task. Mecklinger
et al. found that presentation of the same objects in a passive viewing
task also activated the premotor cortex. Thus, the observed activation
during the working memory task could have been simply a by-product
of seeing the objects rather than an indication of support from the mo-
tor system. In contrast, by looking at actual performance, we were able
to show that affordances do not contribute to memory.
Our results illustrate that interpretation of brain imaging results is
quite complicated and has to be done with caution. Imaging results are
often correlational, and therefore cannot tell us whether activation re-
flects core, necessary processing or mere by-products of processing (Aue
et al. 2009; Poldrack 2008; Horn & Poldrack 2009). Moreover, because
brain regions are parts of larger networks and are used by multiple
processes, activity in a brain region cannot be used to conclude that
a specific process was going on. In this particular case, activity in the
premotor cortex during a working memory task had been interpreted
as showing the involvement of affordances, but our results indicate that
this was probably a logical fallacy of affirming the consequent. With the
interference method used in our studies we can look at the causal rela-
tion between affordances and memory performance, and we conclude
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